Marxism and Liberal Political Philosophy, Part I

This is the first of what I hope to be a series of reflections on the meaning of Marxism for contemporary work in deontological liberal political theory, sparked by my reading of Jonathan Wolff's Why Read Marx Today?. The question is worth asking, if only because Wolff fails throughout his generally excellent discussion to address it head on.

First, let me briefly summarize a few of the points Wolff makes in his book. He begins by explaining some of Marx's key ideas, among them alienation, exploitation, the nature of labor, class exploitation, the theory of historical materialism, the falling rate of profit, and so on. For readers even slightly familiar with Marx's ideas, most of this will be old hat, though potentially useful in refreshing one's memory. Alienation is a key idea for social and political theory, and Wolff puts it nicely by suggesting that it is the severing of an expected, normatively or culturally anticipated relation: two things that are meant to relate to one another do not. In this sense, it becomes clear that we are alienated from pretty much everything in the contemporary world. We use things made by others, though in all likelihood these things were made by numerous people, in concert with an even greater number of specialized machines. Even our landscape is produced, and Wolff observes that, for example, natural parkland is only natural by decree i.e. someone decided that development would either not occur, or cease, in a given geographical locale. And despite the dubious assertion that we are now fully ensconced in a global knowledge economy, it is clear that the majority of highly skilled jobs involve the production of gross intangibles. We do not even have potential access to what we make, except symbolically in the form of money.

The other important thought that Wolff sheds light on is the basic thesis of historical materialism, namely that human history has been governed by its productive capacity: human history is the history of human production. Each epoch is characterized by a specific mode of production, and it continues to be plausible to argue that when productive forces exceed the economic structures that enshrine them, things will change. The question, of course, is whether free market capitalism is the only system capable of dealing with the radically proliferating complexity of our productive ingenuity. Indeed, the contradictions that Marx predicted would arise in his near future seem very distant from our present. Despite the growing prominence of anti-globalization movements and the like, capitalism seems to be doing pretty well, especially when we factor in the normal patterns of boom and bust predicted by standard theories of the business cycle.

Anyway, Wolff's main idea is that Marx's predictions, regarding the failure of capitalism and the rise of communist socialism, are far less important than his scathing critiques of capitalist society. In particular, he says that Marx made a clear distinction between political rights and human emancipation, and while the former are in a general sense good, they are by no means sufficient for the cause of greater human freedom and equality. The right to political participation, to vote and stand for office, may have little impact on my quality of life. Voting, when not done out of habit, requires some sort of intellectual commitment, some abstract perception of political obligation, that most people are not willing to make. That is, it is my democratic right to remain disinterested in democratic politics, even though in the long run my failure to participate could conceivably lead to the revocation of my freedom to not give a damn. Human emancipation, on the other hand, means actively ameliorating the human condition. In Marxian terms, this consists first and foremost in removing people from the oppressive conditions that go hand in hand with labor under capitalism.

The idea I want to touch on in this first part is the common sense one that most philosophical liberals probably desire that people realize the rights that it is their right to possess, but give little thought to how this would work in practice. Moreover, the kind of rights they focus on, freedom of expression, religious pluralism, political participation, are seldom the most pressing ones.

I can only think of three basic human rights: liberty, equality, and justice. All else, to my mind, is secondary. Clearly, freedom of expression, to take one example, is a species of liberty. I would not be truly free, were I not free to express my deeply held opinions without the threat of sanction. But what does freedom of expression really mean to persons who can hardly maintain the fundamental material conditions of their own existence, and that of their families? There are more important things for liberal political philosophers to worry about, even though their micro-interests generally pose fascinating intellectual problems. Marx reminds us that intellectuals thinking about society take on a real set of responsibilities regarding that society; and he urges us to treat them seriously. Even if this is only an intellectual engagement, well short of joining protesters in the street, it seems worthwhile. The first step of liberal political theory in the coming years, after the elaboration of grand theories from the likes of Rawls, Dworkin, and Scanlon, is to think about how the ideals of political democracy more often than not fail to be realized in the real world. Where Marx comes in, at least initially, is in reminding us that these ideals do not go far enough, that political thought is insufficient without a set concern for the real welfare of human beings. Economic, cultural, and scientific factors, must migrate into the ambit of political theory and political reflection. I discuss this further in the next part. In particular, I will be concerned with how the Marxist theory of alienation is to some extent relieved by the Rawlsian idea of public reason.