Aggression and the threat of nuclear terrorism

Graham Allison, author of the seminal Essence of Decision, has an article on nuclear proliferation in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that is as ambitious as it is flawed.

His argument goes like this. The availability of fissile material is the key to nuclear proliferation. If persons with terrorist intent could not get a hold of such material, there would be no terrorist nuclear threat. To bring about this end, Allison argues that the Bush administration must follow an aggressive three-pronged policy:

1. It must work, in cooperation with other legitimate nuclear states, to secure all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and materials, and do this transparently, so that all participating states can be sure of each other’s compliance.

2. The United States must ensure that countries with presumed nuclear ambitions do not have access to fissile material.

3. Consonant with the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the international community must dedicate itself to preventing the emergence of new nuclear states.

The notion that the availability of fissile material should be the focus of preventing nuclear terror is a crude empirical simplification. It is true but trivial. And we should notice that Allison refrains from following the thought to its logical conclusion, namely that an even surer way of preventing such access would be to get rid of nuclear weapons (and possibly nuclear energy) altogether. Both statements are equally unrealistic.

The charge that Allison refuses to factor practicability into his prescriptive analysis is valid across the board. For example, he suggests that a new “International Security Standard” should be developed by the United States and Russia to guarantee that their nuclear stocks be insusceptible to terrorist pilfering. Presumably, this would entail U.S. inspectors having free access of inspection to the Russian nuclear inventory. But how plausible is it to assume that American politicians, not to mention the American public, would welcome the prospect of Russian inspectors regularly visiting the numerous nuclear holy of holies dotted throughout the Midwest? What international legal provisions would be put in place to guard against perceived breaches in security? The United States, notoriously protective of its sovereignty in domestic affairs, would be unlikely to subscribe to an initiative allowing Russians to judge its self-defined standards once they were in place.

A similar argument can be made against his proposed “Global Cleanout Campaign.” Here, the idea is that a coalition of nuclear states (those, presumably, that are signatories to the International Security Standard) use all means necessary to halt the worldwide production of fissile material. Allison holds that if diplomatic persuasion or economic sanctions fail in this regard, the use of force is a legitimate option. With a good portion of the U.S. military still bogged down in Iraq, and with their continued presence there over the next few years a certainty, I’m not sure why Allison thinks going to war with Iran, North Korea, and possibly Pakistan is even possible, or for that matter legitimate.

An analogous strategy is elaborated for preventing new nuclear states. If sanctions and diplomacy fail, the U.S. is compelled to use its military might in order to quell the possibility for these nations to become vendors of nuclear weapons selling to parties hostile to the America and the West. Given the recalcitrance of proud states and even prouder leaders to change their ways in the face of unilateral aggression (even when this is masked as a “coalition of the willing”), there is good reason to expect that force will eventually become a part of this endeavor. Thus, Allison shockingly remarks:

“Horrific as the consequence of a preemptive attack on North Korean nuclear facilities would be, the prospect of a nuclear North Korea willing to sell its weapons to al Qaeda and other terrorists would be worse.”

According to Philip Saunders of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the consequences of a preemptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities could be disastrous. Although Pyongyang has limited air defense capabilities, it is reasonably certain that it has between 500 to 600 Scud missiles that could be deployed within minutes against targets throughout South Korea. Furthermore, the North Koreans also have 100 Rodong missiles capable of reaching targets in Japan. Add to this the fact that 70% of the North Korean military are stationed in close proximity to the demilitarized zone, and the truly horrific possibility of one or two fully operational nukes, and it is difficult to share Allison’s assuredness that preemption is better than a nonviolent alternative.

Clearly, this is a worst case scenario. However, in deciding whether to attack North Korea, American officials must weigh the probability of counterattack against the long-term danger of Kim Jong Il peddling his nuclear wares to our enemies. As a moral digression, we should also note that Allison’s argument is strongly consequentialist, asserting that it is better to kill one man so that the lives of ten can be spared. Such a calculation could only be made hypothetically, and the decision to strike North Korea, Iran, or another nation would ultimately derive its justification from the predictions of arm-chair analysts betting on an opaque future. Conversely, a principled foreign policy flatly claims that killing is wrong, and an act of war can never be sanctioned by analyzing the numbers of estimated casualties. Remember that at the height of the Cold War, similar reasons were given in order to justify a preemptory nuclear release of U.S. armaments against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that this logic was as wrongheaded then as it is now.

To put my cards on the table, I am of the opinion that military means are never an attractive way to resolve an international crisis, though the use of force is sometimes unavoidable. But the contemplation of military action is ill-considered in the clearly laudable effort to limit nuclear terrorism.

The heart of the matter is not, as Allison contends, the presence of easily accessible and poorly controlled stores of fissile material. Rather, it is the willingness of clandestine groups and individuals to use them in the pursuit of nefarious and destructive ends targeting the citizens of any nation. The horror of a nuclear attack on the United States is unthinkable, but so is an attack using commercial airliners against innocents working in the steel and glass symbols of American capitalism. How can these incidents be ranked according to the macabre metric of comparative death tolls?

The real task before us, one that President Bush has rightly presented in word if not in deed, is the War on Terrorism, not the war on nuclear weapons. And this war, if “war” is the right term for it, must be carried out by the international community as a whole. In fact, it is not hard to see that lacking international cooperation, preemptive action is liable to court the ignominious shadow of preemptive failure. The war on terror is a war on the micro-motives of highly dispersed fugitives cultivating a murderous yen for theocratic revolution and willing the triumph of disembodied traditions generally unrecognized by their native cultures. The Muslim world is no more bent on jihad than Christian nations are on another crusade.

Rooting out individual terrorists and bringing them to justice inherently calls on the efforts of an enormous array of transnational and decentralized resources. The willingness of local police throughout the Arab world to go in search of terror-minded criminals is just as important as the work of financial experts tracing the sinuous routes of international cash flows. Similarly, the power to define the scope of anti-terrorist activities must be vested as much in the hands of national governments and regional territories as it is in the all too visible political gigantism of the United States. No rational person would deny that all persons living in today’s global community have a stake in bringing the latest and most insidious wave of terrorism to an end. But realizing this goal depends on recognizing that the world is not as global as theorists of international relations would have us believe, that the relevant individuals and communities must be given an autonomy and respect commensurate with the gravity of their task.

Allison concludes his article with the following:

“Of course, this new principle [the ‘Bush Doctrine’] has yet to be enshrined in international law. It has, nonetheless, already become a de facto rule of international relations.”

Although I am extremely uncertain that the Bush Doctrine does possess this de facto status, the implication that legitimacy will eventually issue from a state of affairs that weaker nations are powerless to change is demeaning and incorrect. Indeed, such logic is a demonstrated recipe for the rise of anti-American sentiment, rather than a comforting fact presaging an inevitable confluence of national will with international mandate. Indeed, a recent opinion poll of 11 nations suggests that more than 60% of those questioned bore a markedly unfavorable attitude toward George W. Bush. Allison’s ironic program of aggression as the preferred means of combating the nuclear ambitions of terrorists promises to increase, not reduce, this figure, while at the same time driving a stake of distrust and animosity through the still strongly beating heart of international cooperation.

It is tempting to think that having isolated a problem, further ratiocination will discover its solution right around the corner. Allison has managed to do neither. Curbing the potential for hostile militants to acquire nuclear weapons is but one particularly frightening tentacle sprouting from the Medusa of international terrorism. And, like Hercules, we must calculate our blow to take off the head. In the just enactment of this myth in the contemporary world, we need to ensure that our Hercules is invested with the collective strength of nations, and that his sword is sharpened by the principled action of naturally willing communities.